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Policy Research Working Paper 5955
This paper provides an analytical discussion of several 
interconnected resource allocation problems from under-
pricing of electricity used by farmers for groundwater 
extraction. In these situations, groundwater extraction is 
inefficiently high even without electricity under-pricing. 
Moreover, part of the electric power supply intended 
for farmers is often diverted to other unauthorized uses 
(notably illicit consumption). The paper demonstrates 
that unless non-price electricity rationing imposes severe 
constraints on demand, the range of resource allocation 
problems includes insufficient incentives to provide high-
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level service by the power utility, insufficient incentives 
for farmers to install and operate efficient equipment, 
and losses due to political “rent seeking” activities to 
influence water allocations. It also shows that diversion 
of electricity to illicit uses can increase overall economic 
efficiency when this leads to less electricity use by farmers, 
thus somewhat ameliorating the problem of excessive 
groundwater extraction as well as the inefficiencies 
related to under-pricing of electricity. Systemic reforms 
for overcoming these problems may face severe political 
obstacles.Allocative Inefficiencies Resulting from Subsidies to  
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1.  Introduction 
 
This paper seeks to discuss interactions between several types of distortions resulting from 
subsidized electricity to agriculture, in cases where distortions related to the over-extraction of 
groundwater used for agricultural production interacts with other types of distortions. The 
idea is to draw some conclusions about the nature of the main distortions, how they can be 
alleviated, and what policies are in case required. The basic problem scenario to be discussed 
involves the following main issues: 
 
1)  Under-pricing of electricity to farmers, leading to generally inefficient use (over-use 
and/or rationing with differences in users’ marginal valuations). 
2)  Most of the electricity is used for extracting groundwater. Very likely, such extraction 
is socially excessive; this problem is compounded by a common-pool problem related 
to groundwater extraction. 
3)  Connected to under-pricing is the fact that electricity is supplied erratically and 
inconsistently (during only part of the day; perhaps not every day; and with erratic 
charge). In consequence, many or most agricultural consumers are effectively 
rationed, and the allocation of electricity supply across users and user groups, and for 
a given user, is inefficient. 
4)  There is illicit extraction which reduces the amount of electricity available for legal 
supply. The resulting consumption may go toward general household supply, or to 
agriculture; but perhaps mostly the former. 
5)  Under-pricing of electricity by power utilities leads to sub-par incentives to provide 
good supply by the same entities. This is, in part, the direct cause of the problem under 
point 3. 
6)  Under-pricing of electricity adversely affects the efficiency of electricity use among 
agricultural consumers. Depending on circumstances, this could result in either 
excessive or deficient private investments in equipment to be used for extracting 
groundwater, such as pumps and tube-well construction. 
7)  Inefficient cropping patterns including general choice of too water-intensive crops.   
 
Such issues have been subject to substantial analysis and discussion, much of it in the context 
of Indian agriculture, focusing in particular on the problem of excessive groundwater 
extraction in Northern India, and distortions of crop choices in that context. Some key 
reference studies are Briscoe and Malik (2006), Banerji et al (2006), Ray (2008), Reddy 
(2005), Shah (2009), and Vaidyanathan (2006). Additional discussion of electricity issues for 
the agricultural sector is provided by Dubash (2005a, b), and Ramachandra Murthy (2009). 
See also the newly released World Bank (2010) study discussing a variety of measures against 
excessive groundwater extraction. This literature generally stresses that low electricity prices 
to the agricultural sector in India is a major factor behind this excessive groundwater 
extraction, which currently affects between 15 and 25 percent of Indian agriculture (World 
Bank 2005, 2010). If nothing is done to correct current developments, there could be drastic 
consequences for a large share of India’s population, in years with only rather marginal 
natural water scarcities. A more recent study by Birner et al (2010) provides an extensive 
discussion of political economy aspects of the “energy-groundwater nexus”, with particular 
application to India. 
 
The World Bank (2010) and Birner et al (2010) studies indicate a number of policy measures 
that can be used to help reduce the problem of excessive groundwater extraction. These 3 
 
measures would be broadly applicable wherever conditions like those in India arise.  The 
World Bank (2010) study argues strongly that if nothing is done with incentives for 
groundwater pumping involving extremely cheap electricity (typically, only a fixed fee per 
farmer and no volumetric charges), increasing strains on groundwater resources will be 
extremely hard to reverse. Both studies recognize that the problem is exceedingly hard to deal 
with politically. In situations like those in India that are addressed in these studies, many poor 
farmers are highly dependent on cheap electricity for their normal crop output, even though a 
substantial share of the overall electricity allocation goes to well-off farmers. Low electricity 
costs for farmers is part of a “social contract” whereby one group of farmers rely on (near cost 
free) surface irrigation water, and another group which relies on pumped groundwater. While 
this represents an “even circle” of sorts, there are serious problems with attempting to upset 
the balance between these two groups of farmers (such as charging for electricity from one 
group without charging for surface water from the other group). Thus, the problem seems 
today to have few “easy fixes”.  
 
We should however note that some researchers, notably Birner et al (2010), open up for a 
more nuanced view on the main driving forces behind the problems of excessive groundwater 
extraction. These authors stress two main, competing, viewpoints: the “market-oriented 
discourse”, and the “welfare-state discourse”.
1 Under the former, the argument runs 
essentially as above: low electricity pricing is the main problem. Under the “welfare-state 
discourse”, low electricity pricing to farmers is not seen as the main cause. Rationing of 
farmers’ water extraction (via rationing of their electricity supplies) is instead considered 
sufficient to keep effective water demand at a “reasonable” level (by this is typically meant a 
level equivalent to demand given a “normal” electricity price, in the absence of rationing). 
Their argument is that farmers use the water they “need”, for the cropping patterns chosen. 
The basic problem, it is argued there, is instead inefficient crop choice, as illustrated in the 
Indian context by the government’s encouragement of paddy cultivation. This argument may 
clearly have some bite: water-intensive crops such as paddy and sugar cane, grown 
extensively in Northern India, are substantially more water intensive than many other relevant 
(and higher-value) crops.  
 
In the model developed below, sufficiently strict rationing of electricity supply to farmers 
could in principle (but only as a special case) implement an overall optimal level of 
groundwater extraction, even in the absence of electricity pricing. We will however see that 
other inefficiencies will then usually result, including inefficient distribution of electricity 
supply (and water extraction) across farmers, and substandard power supply service including 
excessive system losses.  An important caveat is that the discussion in this note will focus less 
on political economy problems of the types stressed in the World Bank (2010) and Birner et al 
(2010) documents, and more on economic issues in particular related to allocation and 
efficiency, including how to identify sources of “allocation loss” relative to benchmarks. 
Importantly, distributional considerations are sidestepped.  
 
Our formal analysis will also be less centered on agricultural issues such as crop choice and 
irrigation patterns and practices, even though such underlying issues are at the heart of the 
problem (in particular, issues pertaining to point 7 above will not be dealt with). These issues 
are discussed only in a summary way, by simply defining a marginal value function for water 
as used in the agricultural sector.  In addition, there is also no substantial discussion of the 
                                                 
1 Birner et al (2010), pp 146-147. 4 
 
basis for the groundwater extraction externality (represented by the “shadow price” parameter 
h in the following). Such a discussion is included in a separate note, Strand (2010).  
 
 
2.  The basic optimality model 
 
The simple model dealt with in sections 2-5 focuses on points 1-4. Additional points will be 
addressed in the expanded model of sections 6-7. Consider a region where the number of 
farmers eligible for low-price electricity supply is given and normalized to unity. Assume that 
these farmers can be sorted into two groups: group 1 where water value and demand are 
“low” at “normal” consumption levels (fraction of consumers in this group equals β); and 
group 2 where water value and demand are “high” (fraction of consumers in this group equals 
1-β). The main difference between the two groups is that only the latter will be assumed to be 
effectively rationed in cases with low electricity prices. Utility functions as fraction of 
available farmers in the two groups are V1(E1) and V2(E2) respectively. E is total electricity 
supplied (and targeted at the agricultural sector). ʱ is the share of electricity “lost” either due 
to illicit use or to transmissions losses. We assume that one unit of electricity used for 
pumping results in one unit of groundwater extracted, which is the basic production factor 
going into agricultural production.
2 Our assumption in the following is that electricity that 
does not reach farmers, ʱE, is all used but not by intended users and not paid for. E1 and E2 
are amounts of electricity consumed by each of the two specified groups of farmers. We can 
then write  
 
(1)                                                         E(1-α) = E1 + E2.  
 
Assume that all electricity is produced by a public power utility at constant marginal cost c. 
Assume also that the marginal social opportunity cost of groundwater extraction is constant 
per extracted water unit, including the cost of pumping, and equals some number h > 0. The 
parameter h consists of two parts: one “private” part which is pumping cost per unit of water 
used in agricultural production; and one “social” part which is the pure shadow value of 
groundwater left in the aquifer.
3 Both c and h are likely to vary across regions; c varies with 
production technologies in the power sector (and because there is not sufficient inter-regional 
capacity to secure a unitary national electricity price); and h varies because the seriousness of 
the groundwater extraction problem, and the depth to the water table in the aquifer, is greater 
in some regions than in others.  
 
Consider now the optimal allocation of electricity between the two agricultural sectors and 
also to “illicit use”, and where the value of electricity consumption for illicit users is assumed 
given by the (increasing and strictly concave) function G(ʱE). The objective function to be 
maximized is then 
 
                                                 
2 In practice, the amount of electricity required for pumping one unit of groundwater is roughly proportional to 
the depth to the water table. In the presentation here we ignore this issue and assume that the water table level is 
given, and constant, over the period for the analysis. For further discussion of such issues see Strand (2010). 
 
3 In the context of a model where farmers would pay for electricity at delivery cost, the “private” value part 
needs not to be included here, only the “social” part. Here, however, the point of departure is zero electricity 
pricing so that farmers have no incentive to take this “private” part into consideration in their production 
decisions. Moreover, assuming as here that pumping cost per water unit is a constant, it is appropriate to assume 
that h is a constant across farmers. On the other hand, when groundwater depth varies across relevant aquifers, 
the issue is more complex; then h must be viewed as a weighted average across the relevant farmer populations. 5 
 
(2)                                   1 1 2 2 ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) U V E V E G E h E cE         
 
Maximizing (2) with respect to E1, E2, E and ʱ (given the constraint E1 + E2 = (1-ʱ)E) yields 
the following solutions: 
 
(3)-(4)                                                       12 '' V V c h     
 
(5)                                                                     ' Gc  . 
 
By (3)-(4), optimality implies that the marginal value of electricity use should be equal for 
both user groups, and both should equal the total marginal cost of electricity use, comprised of 
the marginal production cost, c, and the marginal extraction cost for groundwater, h. By (5), 
the marginal benefit for illicit users should be equal to marginal production cost only (and 
thus lower than for agricultural electricity users).  
 
It may here seem unusual for an optimal solution to entail illicit consumption, here for 
electricity and possibly in substantial amounts. But the direct conclusion from the model is 
even stronger: Given the model assumptions, it is optimal for the “illicit” market to enjoy 
“more” electricity than the regular market (in the sense that the marginal utility of electricity 
consumption should be lower for illicit use). For a given supply of electricity from the power 
utilities, the allocation loss is less when more of this electricity goes to illicit users, and less to 
farmers. The reason for this is that the only difference in our model between illicit and 
agricultural electricity users is that only the latter and not the former imposes a negative 
externality due to additional groundwater extraction (since, it is assumed, illicit users do not 
extract groundwater). This assumption could be misleading. Other assumptions may also be 
questioned: since illicit users are not charged, it is not known who has high and who has low 
values of consumption. We are also abstracting from illicit user costs, and ignoring fairness 
and distribution arguments (it can perhaps be argued that a party that steals a commodity has 
no right to it; this is however no particular argument here). Finally, we are ignoring the 
problem that implementing the efficient allocation of electricity consumption among illicit 
users is practically impossible. This is because these users are not charged a price for the 
electricity that they consume. 
 
We also assume that the power utility is unable to directly separate its supply to farmers from 
its supply to illicit users; given fractions go to each of the two groups once basic power is 




3.  Equal power allocation to all agricultural consumers 
 
We will now compare the solution in the simple optimization model above, to a case where 
electricity is allocated equally to all agricultural users. This implies that   
 
(6)                                                        E1 = β(1-α)E,  
 
(7)                                                      E2 = (1-β)(1-α)E.  
 
Inserting this into (2) and differentiating with respect to ʱ and w now yields (5), plus the 
additional condition 6 
 
 
(8)                           12 '( (1 ) ) (1 ) '((1 )(1 ) ) V E V E c h               
 
The only difference between (8) and (3)-(4) is that there is now a fixed relation between the 
relative electricity consumption levels of groups 1 and 2 such that each consumer has the 
same share of the total electricity supply. We have here assumed that group 1’s value of such 
an allocation at the margin is negligible; while group 2’s value is high. As an approximation 
we set V1’ = 0 so that 
 
(9)                                       2 (1 ) '((1 )(1 ) ) V E c h         . 
 
We now see more sharply the difference between the two cases: The marginal utility of 
electricity consumption to consumers with “high” value is now increased by a factor of 1/(1-
β) relative to the solution in (4), for a given level of electricity supplied, E. The idea is to 
mimic a more realistic solution in this case, than that given by (3)-(4).  In the previous case 
we assumed, unrealistically, that electricity was allocated efficiently across all consumers, 
despite no positive price of electricity being charged of any consumer. It is then instead 
realistic that the marginal value of consumption (which is, typically, rationed for all 
consumers) varies across consumers. This leads to an allocation loss relative to the efficient 
solution where all marginal utilities are the same.  
 
Note also that with solution (9), it is required that the return to “high-value” farmers is very 
high, and may be unrealistically so. Remember that these farmers still pay nothing for the 
electricity they receive; the only allocation mechanism to ensure such a high return is 
rationing of overall supply. The main point to be made with this case is then that, when V2’ is 
at a given level for both cases, the rigidity of supply depicted here (whereby all consumers are 
given the same water allocation) implies additional inefficiencies. 
 
 
4.  Fixed electricity allocations 
 
Consider next a case where the overall supply of electricity, E, is exogenous, identified as the 
(maximum free) electricity supply promised to farmers; and ʱ (the fraction of the electricity 
intended for farmers but going instead to illicit users) is also given. Since electricity is 
provided for free to farmers, we presume (as before) that V1’ = 0 (the marginal value of 
electricity supply for “low-value” farmers is zero). We also assume that (1-β)V2’  = k < c+h, 
where k (= the marginal gross value of electricity consumed by the agricultural sector in this 
case) is a fixed number. This amounts to an assumption that the overall marginal return to 
electricity for farmers in this (high-value) group, in a rationing solution, is less than the social 
opportunity cost of electricity going to farmers, c+h. While this assumption may appear 
plausible, it will not always be fulfilled when there is serious rationing. See in particular 
Banerji et al (2006) who argue that the optimal amount of irrigation water to (some sets of) 
farmers in Northern India may be inefficiently low (at least when the groundwater value is not 
accounted for). With our notation, we would in such cases have V2’ > c for this group; when 
then both β and h are small our assumption may not hold. This would correspond to the story 
line under the “welfare-state-oriented discourse” in Birner et al (2010), where low electricity 
prices are not the root cause of any groundwater over-extraction problem. There would then 7 
 
however be no groundwater extraction problem: the problem would instead be too little 
extraction.
4 We disregard this possibility in the following. 
 
It is here of interest to study implications of changes in E and ʱ from an arbitrary, inefficient, 
starting point. We find: 
 
(10)                                                      ( ' )
dU
G h k E
d
    
 
(11)                                        (1 )( ) ( ')
dU
h c k c G
dE
        . 
 
G’+h-k expresses the excess marginal net social return from increased electricity supply to 
illicit users rather than to agricultural users. This could be positive or negative. However, 
when h is high (there is a large negative externality from groundwater extraction), and k is 
low (farmers’ return to electricity consumption is low at the margin), dU/dʱ could easily be 
positive. Some might view it as paradoxical that it is optimal to allocate less of a given 
electricity supply to legitimate (agricultural) consumers, and more to illegitimate ones. 
 
In (11) the two main terms express the net return of electricity going to (legitimate) 
agricultural users, and to illegitimate users, weighted with the groups’ fractions. The first is 
unambiguously negative (under our assumptions), and the second also most likely negative.  
 
Note here that when some part of illicit electricity consumption, say a fraction γ, is used for 
groundwater extraction (compared to none of this consumption), we must replace G’ by G’-γh 
which is lower and makes it more likely that both dU/dʱ and dU/dE are negative. 
 
 
5.  The effects of activities to influence the legitimate electricity share 
 
We will next consider a case where “influence activities” (rent seeking, corruption, etc) play a 
role. Such activities could take many forms. One form would be corrupt diversion of 
electricity (for private gain by public officials) from legitimate to illegitimate users. Another, 
on which we focus here, is activity initiated by farmers to reduce the illegitimate share of 
electricity supply that was originally aimed at the agricultural sector. This may be a natural 
focus here, since such activity may be seen as not necessarily corrupt but rather as an integral 
part of the political process. The point is that a certain amount of electricity is assumed to be 
set off for agricultural users, but that only part of this electricity actually reaches its 
destination; another part is diverted, illegitimately. The activity taking place, to reduce this 
“drain”, may then be fully legitimate. 
 
Assume then that the parameter ʱ is affected by effort, B, to increase the agricultural share of 
electricity supply, and thus to reduce the illicit share ʱ (which could be viewed as losses by 
farmers, and perhaps also by the power utility). Efforts to reduce ʱ could be exerted either by 
the agricultural sector, or by the power utility. Our view will thus be that B represents 
farmers’ efforts (principally, those farmers in group 2, with a positive marginal value of 
                                                 
4 As we however have already noted, there could be water over-extraction in the sense that crop choice of Indian 
farmers is inefficient and too water-demanding. 8 
 
additional electricity). We assume that there exists a downward-sloping and strictly convex 
function ʱ(B), ʱ’(B) < 0, ʱ’’(B) > 0, primes denoting derivatives. 
 
B could in principle represent physical effort by farmers, or money or goods transfers (bribes) 
from the agricultural sector to employees of the power utility. The form that B takes has 
welfare implications of this activity. When B is “effort”, it is a social cost to be subtracted in a 
social calculation. When B is instead a transfer (bribe), it is not necessarily a social cost (as 
there is a corresponding benefit for the receiving party). We will as our main case assume that 
B is “effort” and thus a social cost.
5 
 
The new condition relative to the analysis in sections above is here the condition for 
optimization of net utility with respect to B, for farmers with positive marginal value of 
electricity. For these, the net utility function can now be written as  
 
(12)                                                    V2((1-β)(1-α)E) – B, 
 
which is maximized with respect to B to yield 
 
(13)                                            2 (1 ) '((1 )(1 ) ) '( ) 1 EV E B          
 
(13) can be solved for B and thus for ʱ (since all other parameters in (13) are exogenous). 
Comparing to a case with no influence activity, ʱ should now generally be lower and the 
share of electricity 1-ʱ going to farmers higher. We can then ask what happens to welfare 
when such activity takes place. This in particular depends on the sign of dU/dʱ in (10). When 
this is positive, the induced reduction in ʱ considered here has a negative welfare implication 
(there is a social loss when farmers get more of the electricity supply). Since B is a social 
cost, the overall welfare impact of influence activities is then negative. When dU/dʱ < 0, it is 
socially advantageous to raise ʱ. The overall welfare effect then depends on the value of this 
welfare gain, compared to the social cost of the influence activity itself, B. 
 
To consider the welfare gain or loss resulting from such activity, assume that the “initial” 
value of ʱ (“before influence activities”) is set at ʱ0, and the value that solves (13) is ʱ1 < ʱ0. 
Then the (positive or negative) welfare change is given by 
 
(14)                                            1 1 0 ( ' ) ( ) U G h k E B        . 
 
The first main term in (14) is the net welfare gain associated with the induced (negative) 
change in ʱ. Given that G’ > k-h, implying that the marginal social return to illicit electricity 
consumption is greater than the return to regular agricultural electricity consumption, a higher 
ʱ is socially gainful. A social loss is then incurred when ʱ is reduced. Since there is an 
additional social cost B related to farmers’ influence activities, the overall welfare effect is 
negative. When G’ < k-h, the induced reduction in ʱ is socially gainful when the costs of 
influence activities, B, are disregarded. Since there however is such a cost, the overall welfare 
effect is ambiguous.   
 
                                                 
5 One should note that even when B is a transfer, it may still often be appropriate to consider such expenditure as 
a social cost, at least in part, as due to distributional or moral considerations, or since such payments tend to have 
adverse allocational implications at least in the long run (one being that highly qualified personnel are attracted 
to such activity, instead of to other activity where their net social returns are higher.  9 
 
A similar analysis could here have been added whereby influence activities are exerted also 
by illicit consumers, in the form of either bribing public servants into increasing the illicit 
consumption share ʱ, or exerting effort to extract the illicit electricity. Using a similar 
argument as above, the welfare effect of such activity could on net be positive or negative. 
When the influence activity is bribing, the welfare effect of such activity is positive given that 
G’ > k-h, as was assumed above to be likely. When the influence activity is effort by illicit 
users, welfare may increase or go down depending on whether the following expression is 
positive or negative: 
 
(14a)                                            2 2 0 ( ' ) ( ) U G h k E H        , 
 
where ʱ2 is the new (and higher) level of ʱ, and H represents influence costs in this case. This 
expression is likely to be positive when H is small, and negative when H is great. 
 
Note finally that when both B and H are exerted simultaneously (as is likely to happen in 
practice), ʱ is affected in opposite directions. A simple case is where ʱ is unaltered by such 
activities. If the activities then have not influence on overall electricity supply intended for 
farmers, E, the net welfare effect of the influence activities is unambiguously negative given 
that B+H > 0 (so that either influence activity is costly).   
 
 
6.  Optimality in an expanded model 
 
We now go back to the basic model of sections 2-3, with an optimal allocation of electricity 
supply and consumption given three sets of consumers (“low” and “high” value agricultural 
users, and illicit users), expanding the model somewhat relative to previous sections. We now 
ignore the influence activities of the previous section, as these are “coping” (and, typically, 
inefficient) strategies that would be redundant under an optimal allocation. We instead 
introduce three new features.  
 
The first new feature is “supply quality”. By this we simply mean the utility gain that legal 
consumers (farmers) obtain from a given power supply, and that this “quality” can be 
influenced by the power utility. Supply quality can vary e.g. as supply is more or less reliable, 
predictable, stable and continuous, with correct and constant voltage, etc. Failures in these 
respects may imply that the value of a given amount (number of kWhs) supplied is lower than 
otherwise. A simple way to represent this is to introduce a shift parameter ˄ into the value 
functions for electricity, for the two agricultural consumer groups 1 and 2, so that these values 
are ˄V1 and ˄V2 respectively. Positive shifts in ˄ are achieved at effort cost, Z, incurred by the 
power utility and its employees, so that ˄(0) = 1 ( “no extra effort” by the utility; the status 
quo situation described above), ˄’(Z) > 0, and ˄’’(Z) < 0 so that there is decreasing marginal 
return to such efforts. Note that with this definition of supply quality, changes in this variable 
do not by themselves affect groundwater pumping for given basic electricity supply. We also 
assume that the quality of power supply to illicit consumers cannot be affected by such 
activities.  
 
The second feature is power utility effort to reduce the share ʱ of illicit power consumption, 
incurring a cost Q. This is related to “influence activity” in section 5 (in the sense that ʱ is 10 
 
affected endogenously in both cases), except that the mechanism by which ʱ is affected is 
different.
6 This entails a function ʱ(Q), where ʱ’(Q) < 0, ʱ’’(Q) > 0. 
 
Thirdly, agricultural power consumers can take action to increase the value of the given 
electricity supplied to them. Since by assumption, all electricity supply to agriculture is used 
for pumping groundwater, greater pumping efficiency on the side of farmers enables them to 
produce more agricultural output on the basis of a given amount of electricity consumed; e g 
through more efficient or rational pumping activity, and better and more economical pumps.
7 
This is here simply modeled such that greater agricultural efficiency in using electrical power 
implies a proportional increase in the amount of groundwater extracted. In the model, these 
effects are represented by the functions ˆi(Ci), i = 1,2, as multiplicative factors to Wi in the 
utility functions for electrical power to agricultural group i, and where Ci is the cost of 
implementing an efficiency improvement (such as installing more efficient pumps, etc.). We 
assume that the ˆ function is increasing and strictly concave, so that ˆi’ > 0, ˆi’’ < 0. 
 
A related issue interacting with this last extension of the model (but which does not directly 
enter into the model) is that as the groundwater table falls and pumping becomes more 
demanding and energy intensive, it also becomes necessary with heavier and more expensive 
pumping equipment. Such concerns will arise in a modeling context given that one studies 
developments over time with variable (falling or rising) groundwater table levels (and degrees 
of replenishment of basic groundwater). 
 
A first-best solution is in this case found by maximizing the following utility function:  
 
(15)                   
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2
( ) ( ( ) ) ( ) ( ( ) ) ( ( ) )
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U Z V C E Z V C E G Q E
h C E C E cE Z Q C C
    

  
      
 
 
subject to the constraint E1 + E2 = (1-ʱ)E). We form the following Lagrangean: 
 
(16)    
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A “first-best” solution here entails deriving first-order conditions of L with respect to E1, E2, 
E, Z, Q, C1 and C2. We find the following set of equations: 
 







   

, i = 1, 2 
 










                                                 
6 In our model below, ʱ is set to optimize the objective function of a benevolent planner. Alternatively, we could 
here model ʱ as being affected by incentives (reward functions) facing power utility employees.  
7 An additional way in which efficiency in electricity use can be improved is via better crop choice by farmers. 
This interpretation is however not emphasized here because of the way in which efficiency in electricity use also 
enters into the water extraction function (as proportional to water extraction). 11 
 



























   

, i = 1, 2 
 
Given internal solutions for all variables (see below), the 7 equations (17)-(23) plus the 
budget constraint for electricity give 8 conditions to determine the 8 endogenous variables E1, 
E2, E, Z, Q, C1, C2 and λ (as, in particular, ʱ is given directly by its functional relationship to 
Q). 
 
These conditions permit us to derive the following marginal optimality conditions: 
 
(24)-(25)                                       ' (1 ) ( ' ) ii G V h c         , i = 1,2 
 
(26)-(27)                                          '
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   , i = 1,2 
 









    
 










, i = 1,2. 
 
In interpreting these conditions, (24)-(25) are essentially the same as conditions (3)-(4) in 
section 2. (26)-(27) state that the marginal value of electricity consumption for agricultural 
consumers of either type, on the left-hand side, is to equal the sum of the “effective 
groundwater extraction externality” per unit of basic electricity consumption, ˆih, plus the 
power supply cost c, plus a term that reflects the additional cost of increasing electricity 
supply to farmers through diversion away from illicit use.  
 
(28) states that optimal illicit electricity consumption is dimensioned such that marginal value 
to illicit users equals marginal electricity provision cost c, minus a term that depends on the ʱ 
function. In particular, G’ should take a lower value here than in the simple model of section 
2. This implies a larger allocation of electricity to illicit consumers. This may seem surprising 
but has a simple explanation. In section 2, we assumed that it was possible to find a direct 
optimum with respect to G, at no particular cost. Here this is assumed not to be the case: 
instead one must resort to expensive diversion activities in order to implement the 
(constrained) optimal G. Assuming then that G “starts” at a higher level (and G’ at a lower 
level, in the absence of any diversion activities) than the final equilibrium level, (28) provides 
the (constrained) optimal final solution for G. Or in other words, it is not optimal to push 
illicit use all the way down to the (unconstrained) optimal level that was found in section 2, 
since this is costly. 
 12 
 
This analysis however raises the question of what happens in the model if the “starting value” 
for G (with Q = 0) is below the final value to be derived from (28). In such cases we have a 
corner solution with this particular G value, and Q = 0. It is then not socially beneficial to 
divert electricity away from illicit use, since the marginal return to electricity use is no higher 
in the agricultural sector. It is rather optimal for the power utility to divert more of a given 
electricity output away from farmers and onto “illicit” consumers.  
 
From (29)-(30), the equilibrium marginal value of electricity enhancing effort (ˆi’) is 
inversely proportional to the marginal social gain from such effort (˄Vi’–h). This implies that 
this effort increases in step with its marginal social gain. A higher h here leads to lower ˆi’ 
and thus higher Ci.  
 
The solution just derived remains a hypothetical target insofar as no effective means of 
implementing it is specified. Implementation would in general require a) that farmers face 
electricity prices equivalent to marginal social costs; b) that the same users be charged for 
efficiency improvements (increases in ˆi) that lead to greater groundwater extraction for given 
electricity consumption; c) that “illicit” electricity consumers be charged the net social cost of 
their consumption at the margin; and d) that the power utility must be provided incentives to 
itself implement efficient levels of both E (thus exerting effort to improve service quality to 
agricultural consumers) and Q (exerting effort to prevent illicit electricity consumption). 
While a) is thinkable in principle (but not likely to be politically realistic), b) and c) are 
difficult to visualize even as in principle (c even an absurdity). d) is also very difficult to 
visualize as a practical solution, as a proper set of optimal incentives (with two independent 
instruments) need to be applied to the power utility itself.
8  
 
The solution may however still be useful as a benchmark with which to compare a practical 
solution, and measure the degree of inefficiency (relative to this hypothetical target).  
 
 
7.  Zero electricity pricing and rationing in the expanded model 
 
We noted that the analysis in section 6 is grossly unrealistic when applied to an agricultural 
sector such as that in India, mainly because it does not account for the fact that electricity is, 
basically, not paid for at the margin by farmers. The actual regime is thus one where 
electricity is rationed to farmers; this assumption was the basis for the discussion in section 4. 
This also opens up for the practical possibility that “influence” activities can be of major 
importance, as was discussed in section 5. We will in this section ignore influence activities, 
and assume (as before) that agricultural consumers in group 1 have zero productivity of 
additional electricity at the margin in a rationing solution (V1’ = 0), as this group is, by 
assumption, not effectively rationed. 
 
The marginal value of water supply can then be written as 
 
(31)                                           2 (1 )( ) ' a
U
k h G c
E
   





                                                 
8 For a related analysis of power utility incentives see Strand (2012). It is here pointed out that multiple 
equilibria may arise when the public’s willingness to pay for utility services is a function of expected service 
quality, which in turn may be a function of payment for services.   13 
 
where k = (1-β)V2’ as before, while we have defined 
 
(32)                                                      12 (1 ) a         
 
as the average efficiency of electricity use among farmers. 
 
We are interested in how electricity rationing combined with a zero electricity price may 
affect incentives of farmers to invest in more efficient pumping equipment. Assuming that V1’ 
= 0 in this case (group 1 is “oversupplied” with electricity), we find the following first-order 
condition for group 2 farmers (who are effectively rationed): 
 









For individual farmers, the groundwater externality cost does not figure in the decision to 
invest in pumps. The lack of this parameter contributes to a lower private marginal value of 
pumping at equilibrium, and greater than socially optimal private investments in pumps. A 
high electricity allocation E2 also, in itself, draws in the same direction. The reason is that 
more available electricity (less strict rationing) makes it more worthwhile to invest in pumps 
so as to better utilize the greater amount of electricity supply available. But, on the other hand, 
a high allocation W2 is likely to be correlated with a low marginal value V2’ of electricity. 
This works in the opposite direction since it reduces the marginal value of groundwater 
extraction, and thus pump efficiency, for given E2. It is, in fact, the product of E2V2’ that 
matters: when this product is at least as high in the rationing case as in the optimality case of 
section 6, pump efficiency choice is greater in the rationing case. We see that the parameter ˄ 
(representing “supply quality” by the electricity supplier, for given amount of electricity 
supplied) also matters. Higher ˄ increases farmers’ value of a given electricity supply which 
here makes them invest more in pumps.
9 We cannot say in general whether these investments 
will be higher or lower than optimal. It could however easily be the case that, in a solution 
with rationing and zero electricity price, some major group of farmers (here, group 2) over-
invests in pump equipment. 
 
The height of the water table has conflicting effects in this context. For given amount of 
electricity available to group 2 farmers through rationing, a lower water table implies that 
more electricity is used to pump a given amount of water, so that water extraction is reduced, 
and the shadow value of electricity use reduced. But this also makes electricity scarcer among 
farmers, as electricity must be used more efficiently in order to achieve the same crop levels. 
Overall, the impact on incentives of farmers of installing extra pumping equipment is 
ambiguous in general. Most likely however the aforementioned cost effect will dominate and 
thus reduce such incentives.   
 
8.  Summary of inefficiency sources, and final comments 
 
We will now, based on the foregoing analysis, compile a brief list of what we believe are the 
most important sources of inefficiency in the allocation of electricity to the agricultural sector 
in a system corresponding to our model. The main elements are as follows: 
                                                 
9 The direction of this effect is not immediately obvious. If delivery quality is represented by the number of 
hours per day of electricity supply, more hours of supply could in principle reduce the need for pumping capacity 
as a given amount of pumping could be spread over a longer time span. 14 
 
 
a)  Excessive extraction of groundwater, so that the marginal return of groundwater, when 
applied in agriculture, does not cover the total marginal costs (the sum of electricity 
provision costs, and the shadow value of groundwater). The main source of this 
distortion is the low price of electricity paid by the agricultural sector, and the 
common-pool nature of the groundwater resource. In the foregoing, we have simply 
taken the marginal groundwater externality (per unit of electricity consumed by 
farmers) as given. In an accompanying paper (Strand (2010)), h (comprising the 
shadow value of remaining water in the aquifer plus the marginal cost of pumping) is 
derived from first principles, under simplifying assumptions. It is there shown that h 
tends to vary with the level of the groundwater table, and takes lower values when the 
table is lower. This follows from the obvious fact that the amount of electricity 
required to pump one unit of groundwater is greater when the water table is lower. 
Since the marginal externality cost per unit of water extracted is (more or less) 
invariant to the level of the groundwater table, this externality cost most be distributed 
over a larger number of electricity units for a lower table, and hence itself be smaller. 
Such an argument must however recognize that the number of electricity units 
required to extract one unit of groundwater varies with depth to the groundwater table 
(pumping height), which is not recognized in the models of this note. 
 
b)  Inefficient allocation of electricity among agricultural users, who are essentially all 
rationed. The marginal product of electricity consumption is then likely to vary 
substantially between farmers, with some having a high and others a very low 
marginal value. This problem is diminished if there exist markets for reselling of 
extracted water among farmers (with and without wells). 
 
c)  Other inefficiencies in the use of electricity among farmers. One is lack of incentive to 
install equipment that would serve to increase the efficiency of electricity use. We 
have however also seen that inefficient extraction can represent a two-edged sword. 
When the allocation of electricity to farmers is given, higher efficiency in its use may 
lead to more groundwater extraction and thus greater negative externalities, which 
may reduce welfare. 
 
d)  Inefficient choice of crops when crop choice depends on water availability. In some 
cases and for some farmers, water will be more plentiful than in the efficient allocation 
(when the electricity pumping price is very low and electricity is not heavily rationed), 
and in other cases less plentiful (when electricity is very heavily rationed). Essentially, 
the inefficiency will take the form that farmers select too water-intensive crops when 
electricity (and water) is plentiful, and the opposite when electricity is heavily 
rationed. 
 
e)  Diversion to illicit use of some part of the electricity supply intended for agricultural 
use. Such diversion may, as an isolated phenomenon, be undesirable. Moreover, 
within the group of illicit users electricity allocation is likely to be sub-optimal (with 
some users have higher marginal utilities than others). Illicit diversion however also 
represents a two-edged sword, given that farmers are initially over-supplied. Since 
more illicit consumption of electricity then might lead to less agricultural 
consumption, negative externalities due to less groundwater being extracted could then 
be reduced (although this would of course not be the intention).  
 15 
 
f)  Excessive influence activities in the agricultural sector to induce (possibly, bribe) 
power utility officials to increase agricultural supply, and to reduce illicit use 
(including direct power losses). Such activities are socially costly, and could in 
addition involve increased externality costs as noted under point d). Similar influence 
activities can be exerted by illicit electricity consumers, to increase illicit use. Such 
activities are directly countervailing to the former. A “zero-sum game” situation may 
easily arise, where different types of influence activities have impacts in opposite 
directions, with no overall major change in outcome.  
 
g)  Inefficient incentives of the power utility to stem losses, when neither the overall 
utility (it bottom line) nor its employees are directly rewarded for this; see also d) and 
e). 
 
h)  Insufficient incentives of the power utility to provide good and reliable service to the 
agricultural sector. Such lack of incentives is exacerbated by the lack of payments for 
electricity delivery (as also stressed by Strand (2011)).
10 Above, this loss takes the 
form of directly reduced utility of agricultural users, for a given power supplied.  
 
In sum, these various misallocations make up a major, and somewhat confusing, set of overall 
distortions, when the entire situation for this system is compared to a (hypothetical) “first-
best” situation. Not all distortions go in the same direction; and some of the distortions tend to 
partly eliminate the adverse effects of other distortions.   
 
An important next step in this analysis would be to obtain a better empirical understanding of 
the quantitative distortions caused by inefficient electricity pricing and supply, in situations 
such as those facing Indian farmers. Initiating that empirical work in turn requires additional 
effort to gather the disaggregated empirical data necessary for estimating the various 
relationships, which is an important issue for future research. This requires additional surveys 
to be done of farmers’ water use and pumping practices; willingness to pay e.g. in terms of 
higher water prices for better service, including the value of water meters; surveys of 
additional features such as how crop choice might depend on effective water prices; and 
various features of pumping equipment. It would also be important in such surveys to include 
groups of farmers with water metering, wherever feasible.  Such data should also include 
supply side data, and data for water table depth and magnitude of groundwater extraction 
externality, which are likely to vary significantly by location.    
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Appendix: List of variables and symbols used in the model, with explanations 
 
E = total electricity supply, Ei = electricity supply to group i (= 1,2) 
ʱ = share of total electricity supply that goes to illicit users (including losses) 
U = objective function (to be maximized by the public sector) 
Vi = utility of electricity consumption for group i (= 1,2). 
h = shadow value of standing groundwater including pumping cost, per unit 
c  = marginal electricity supply cost 
G = value of electricity consumption for illicit users 
β = fraction of farmers that belong to group 1, 1-β = fraction in group 2 (fractions in terms of 
electricity consumption) 
 k = marginal value of electricity consumed by group 2, when rationed (k < c+h) 
B = effort by farmers to have the illicit electricity consumption share reduced, through 
influence activities directed at the utility. 
H = effort by illicit electricity consumers to increase their illicit electricity consumption, 
through influence activities directed at the utility. 
 ˄ = parameter indicating the marginal value of electricity for farmers, in response to effort 
from utilities 
Z = effort by the power utility to affect farmers’ value of electricity (˄) 
Q = cost incurred by the power utility to reduce the share of illicit electricity consumption 
ʦi = efficiency in electricity use of farmers per unit of electricity consumed, for farmers in 
group i (=1,2) 
ʦa = average efficiency in extracting groundwater through pumping, average over all farmers 
Ci = cost to farmers of implementing private efficiency improvements for groundwater 
pumping 
 